Police Decision Making: Science, Policy and Practice for the Use of Deadly Force

Once the proverbial "pull the trigger" decision is made either to let out a Verbal Volley or Fire a Single Shot, it is almost impossible to apply the brakes. The outcome resulting from this could be a frayed relationship with a colleague at work or a loss of life on the streets during police work. 

The last one was seen recently with the police shooting in Ferguson, Missouri, where Officer Darren Wilson fatally shot and killed 18-year old, Michael Brown -- in addition to the precious loss of life of a young man, there were repercussions from riots to citizens' loss of confidence in the police itself. 

DECISION MAKING IN LIFE THREATENING SITUATIONS

Research in evolutionary psychology and cognitive science show the underlying reasons as to why we humans act in a preemptive manner (use force), particularly when life and limb are at stake, even before all the facts are ascertained. They are:

1. Time pressure
2. Physical survival under threat (or) loss of property 
3. (1 & 2 causing) Danger-induced emotional arousal and biased decision making that favors self preservation. 

The simplest way to describe the above is by analyzing the structure of the human brain. Our brain carries the baggage of our evolutionary history, from the time we evolved from reptiles to small mammals and eventually the primates that we are today (homosapiens: Latin for "Wise Man" or "Thinking Man"!). This is revealed in the structure of our triune (3-layered) brain, where the reptilian brain is at the lowest, followed by the Intermediate brain at the next higher level, and the Rational Brain at the highest level.  

Our base instincts pertaining to self preservation and aggression (including quenching hunger, sexual drive, bowel and bladder functions), are largely governed by the primitive or reptilian brain. Whereas mental processes that concern higher-order thinking and symbolic manipulation, say, composing music or reading a map, operate in the rational brain.

So in other words, we the homosapiens, the supposed "Wise Man" are not really WISE when it is to do with  decision making when survival or self preservation are at stake. 

Furthermore, when it is a matter of survival, we would rather assume that the perceived threat is true (or a positive), in the spur of the moment, even if turns out to be false after examination or later reflection. 

Why?  It is better to be wrong than to be sorry (after the fact, say, injury or death). 

Evolutionary psychologists call it the "Snake in the Grass Effect." For example, if we were walking in the woods and get a feeling that something is rubbing on our shin, our non-conscious, reptilian brain makes us jump back even before we get a chance to determine the source for that feeling. Later examination might reveal that we just happened to rub our shin on the bark of a tree giving us that "scaly feeling"! Thus, the "Snake in the Grass Effect."

If in reality that "scaly feeling" turned out to be a tree bark that caused us to jump back in alarm, then, it was a false positive; however, regardless of the error, we have not lost a thing. Perhaps our heart rate and stress hormones levels momentarily elevated due to the hardwired flee or fight response. On the other hand, what it if that "scaly feeling" really happened to be snake? And it is quite possible that on that rare occasion, it might have well turn out to be a real rattle snake with scales! (True Positive). Jumping back in alarm, may actually have helped us survive!

Snake in the Grass Effect

SURVIVAL: DECISION MAKING ON THE POLICING BEAT

How does all this play into policing and decision making?

Police officers are human, too, and succumb to the same decision making processes described above that are governed by the reptilian brain and false positives (snake in the grass effect). Furthermore, their decision making maybe affected due to implicit biases when a suspected person belongs to another racial or ethnic category. Alas, that is how the brain is wired given its evolutionary history.

BUT, this is no excuse for police officers to open fire on innocent citizens. To prevent this, police departments have policies such as Use of Force Continuum (picture below), as to when the use force is appropriate and, thus, can be escalated. (A recent addition are body-worn cameras to deter the officer from unwarranted use of force.)

The classic definition for the philosophy of policing, which drives much of training and policing practice in the US is informed by the scholar Egon Bittner's (1985) classic paper*. He observed:

"The police are best understood as a mechanism for distributing nonnegotiable coercive force in accordance with an intuitive grasp of situational threats to social order. This definition of the police role presents a difficult moral problem; setting the terms by which a society dedicated to peace can institutionalize the exercise of force...."

But how does a police officer, in high stakes situations, get an intuitive grasp of situation threats? And how does one prevent false positives, particularly when transitioning from Level Four use of force to Level Five. And, in practical terms, under stressful situations, when danger-induced emotional arousal (reptilian brain), drives much of cognition, is it even possible to recall the Use of Force Continuum? 

These questions need to be asked and researched and solutions developed by taking a multi-pronged approach in the following areas:

• Selection and recruitment procedures of police officers (by taking into consideration individual profiles (psychological and  personality attributes); and appropriate screening to determine whether a candidate has innate or maladaptive cognitive and physical abilities for policing).
• Police training curriculum and methods (techniques and simulations to impart knowledge, skills, abilities to tamp down hardwired responses such as the "Snake in the Grass Effect").
• Policies, procedures and protocols (on use of force; buddy-system; back-ups).
• Technologies that monitor and/or augment officers' contextual-intelligence (person & place) and real-time situational awareness.

Before I conclude this article, I want us to consider a hypothetical question, which is both daring and crazy at once, a heresy even to utter in the context of policing in the United States:

Would having unarmed police officers conduct community policing reduce the TOTAL number of unwarranted killings -- loss of lives -- of both Citizens and Police Officers?

I am not sure what the answer would be. Because, it is unacceptable for any loss of innocent life, be that of an officer or a citizen. 

But by asking the above question, I raise a plausible solution (pointers, really) in terms of officer recruitment, training, police comms. & computing technology and policy.  Because from a human factors standpoint an unarmed police officer should have built-up extraordinary abilities to diffuse a situation, without the use of force.  In other words, our hypothetical unarmed police officer needs to have the following:

• high level of skills in communications (persuasion/dissuasion, body & verbal language); 
• expertise in naturalistic decision making (ability to quickly discern the type of situation, then engage or disengage from person & incident -- particularly in an one-on-one situation where there is uncertainty about the level of threat and the suspect's desire to inflict bodily harm on the police officer);
• augmenting pre-engagement decision making with technology (sensors, warnings, pre-engagement alerts) that enhance contextual intelligence and situational awareness and enables the right go/no-go decision;
• Socio-psychological abilities (command presence, language, tone of voice, community engagement) & physical fitness and expertise in martial arts 

All of the above, in my opinion, can contribute in the officer maintaining the locus of control and confidence. (Often times, it is a loss of confidence or fear, which leads to pulling the trigger.)

The take-away message is policing requires men and women with extraordinary capabilities and skillsets in multiple dimensions. They not only need physical strength, but also wit and wisdom on the fly. In other words, they need to be real HOMOSAPIENS, a.k.a., "the Wise Man" that we are capable of being when our rational brain is operational. What can and should be done by policy makers, researchers, recruiters, trainers, commanders, and actual policing practice, so that we have "wise men and women" police officers on the ground? And, more importantly, can it be realized in policing culture and practice quickly enough to prevent the next Ferguson? 

About the author:

Moin Rahman, is a Principal Scientist at HVHF Sciences, LLC. He specializes in:

"Designing systems and solutions for human interactions when stakes are high, moments are fleeting and actions are critical."

For more information, please visit:

http://hvhfsciences.com/

http://www.linkedin.com/in/moinrahman

HVHF Article Archive: http://hvhfsciences.blogspot.com/

E-mail: moin.rahman@hvhfsciences.com

Touch Screen User-Interfaces: Touching to KNOW vs.Touching to say NO

Touché to TOUCH?!

We have evolved the sense of Touch to Know, to glean information about an object.

In this context, a physical object is its own user-interface. It doesn't require a Capacitive or Inductive Touch Screen to probe it and get a pixilated answer on the screen!

Why?

By touching an object we learn about its status. Obtain feedback whether it is hot/cold, rough/smooth, dangerous/safe, clean/dirty, ripe/unripe, etc.

Sometimes we touch objects with a purpose.

• to brush away dirt
• to make indents
• to scratch or scour it off some wanted or unwanted material

Touch as a Mode of Interaction

Physical manipulation -- pushing a button, flicking a toggle, pulling a T-handle, turning a knob/wheel, etc. -- was the norm for user-interaction in the industrial age. One literally had to overcome the force of the mechanism (which by the way also provided valuable haptic and kinesthetic feedback, but fatiguing from a muscular effort standpoint) while interacting with them. Thus they were referred to as Machine Cowboy interfaces.

Next came the Analog Professional where the physical effort was made easy due to hydraulics, solenoids and actuators (e.g., Power Steering). And user-interface technology and interaction grammar evolved over time. Now we are in the touch input epoch that has been extended to things such as Fly-by-Wire and Drive-by-Wire. Where an input, say, on a touch screen or joy stick is converted into a digital signal, which, in turn, changes the speed of the HVAC fan in a car or the flaps on the wing of a plane. 

But when and where did Touch interaction first appear? You would be surprised to learn that the earliest touch interaction was more on the physical continuum and didn't involve a LCD screen; because it was the degree of pressure exerted on the interface was the input!

The world's first touch interface was the Electronic Sackbut. (Follow this link for an illustrated history of Touch Input Technologies).

1948: The Electronic Sackbut: The right hand controls the volume by applying more or less pressure on the keys; the left hand control four different sound texture options via the control board placed over the keyboard (Courtesy: NPR) 

Now let us compare the Electronic Sackbut's user-interface with an ubiquitous piece of technology of our time, the iPhone.

iPhone's Touch Interface

The iPhone with its multi touch user-interface (e.g., pinch, rotate, swipe, etc.) is a marvel. But there is one big difference between the electronic sackbut and the iPhone. The gateway to touch interaction on the iPhone, the "icons" are filled with semiotic information: Symbols; Signs; Text.

Thus one needs to perceive and interpret the semiotic information, visually and cognitively, before deciding to do something with it. The iPhone certainly is not a problem when visual or cognitive attention are not fragmented, which is not the case when one is multitasking (e.g., driving and using the phone).  And, there are many other tasks besides driving, which involve multitasking.  For example, it could be a public safety professional such as a police officer who needs to be vigilant about his environment; that is, not be visually tunneled with his eyes riveted on the screen of his radio communication device, compromising his own safety in the process.

The challenges faced in user-interaction during multitasking not only apply to a touch screen, but also for an UI bedecked with an array of physical push-buttons that have similar characteristics.

Another important noteworthy point is that the touch and feel of the icons on the iPhone are one and the same. They don't distinguish themselves from each other on the tactile / haptic / pressure dimension. They all feel the same, even with a haptic vibe, and, thus, provide the same affordances.

An affordance is a property of an object, or an environment, which allows an individual to perform an action. For example, a knob affords twisting, and perhaps pushing, while a cord affords pulling. (via Wiki)

Varieties of Physical Affordances
Some affordances maybe contextually goal driven: e.g., using a hammer as a paper weight.

The concept of affordance has also been extended to encompass virtual objects. Although, some experts tend to disagree with this definition as it lacks physical feedback.  E.g., touching a touch-sensitive icon "affords" an action: a feature or app is opened. Or in a mouse point and click paradigm, icons, radio buttons and TABS are affordances (Figure below).

Virtual Affordances on a Graphical User-Interface (GUI)

Touching to KNOW vs. Touching to say NO

I began this article by explaining the importance of touching to "know," a naturally evolved human ability that makes interacting with objects in the world intuitive (second nature). Now, contrast this with touching to say No (Figure below).

"Touching to say 'No'": this is a touch interaction that is contingent on correctly comprehending and processing the semiotic information. It requires a higher level of visual attention and cognitive effort.

A pure semiotic interface, with like-affordances, is just not limited to touch screens. But it may also include an array of buttons (same "push" affordance). Although, physically pushing a button, in an array of similar buttons has a tactile / kinesthetic dimension to it, one still needs to cognitively process the icon or label on the button. So in some ways, they are similar to icons arranged in an array on a touch screen, all with the same physical affordances. This indeed can pose a problem in multitasking environments, such as driving, where one may have to visually look at the buttons, perceive the semiotic information and select the appropriate one, and, then, push it.

The array of similar push buttons with same affordances (except for 3 knobs) on this multi band mobile radio used inside a police car provide a physical dimension to the interaction, which is good. But from a semiotic point of view, they are similar to a touch screen and may impose similar visual and cognitive workloads in a driving / multitasking context. (Image via Motorola Solutions)

Automotive Industry Going-ons with Touch Input

A recent headline was an eye grabber for designers in the automotive and technology worlds:

Ford admits touchscreen defeat, puts the buttons and knobs back into Ford Sync

The Center Stack of a Ford Vehicle. Regardless of the control being virtual or a physical button, there is a heavy reliance on semiotic information, including very similar affordances ("push") (Image and full article at: Extreme Tech)

Ford's move towards replacing virtual touch buttons with physical buttons may yield some performance improvements but may not be a significant one. Due to reasons discussed above: similar affordances, semiotic dependence.

Besides a heavy reliance on semiotic information, there has also been a push towards a reliance on inferential reasoning and separated control-to-display relationships on different planes and surfaces that result in additional cognitive load. The Cadillac CUE Infotainment System (video) is one such example. It illustrates the amount of learning and inferential reasoning required to interact with it.

Cadillac CUE Infotainment System

But there is some good news. There have been some novel ideas about touch screen design for cars. See video below.

Novel Ideas for Touch Screen Interface in Cars (Detailed article in Wired)

The Future: Mixed Modal Interactions

Our naturally evolved way of interacting with other humans, animals, objects and artefacts in the world involve touch, speech, gestures, bodily-vocal demonstrations (including facial expressions), among other things. Could a human-machine interface, particularly in a critical piece of technology (medical, critical comms., aviation, automotive, command & control rooms, etc.), be built to be compatible with what's natural to us?

Speech interfaces have gained both credibility and popularity (thank you Siri) and gestural interfaces are moving on from gaming apps to other utilitarian technologies such as cars. See figure below.

Drawings from a 2013 Microsoft patent application suggests gestures that would serve, from left, as commands to lower and raise the audio volume and a request for more information.CreditUnited States Patent and Trademark Office  via New York Times

As we march into the future, be it a car, robot or a treadmill, a semiotically-laden, like-affordances heavy, buttons-galore or touch-only UI, filled with metaphors and inferential reasoning, may not be a good idea. Consider these two examples as my closing statement as to WHY?:

How many of us can recount the experience of inadvertently changing the speed instead of the incline when running on the treadmill? In most treadmills, both these controls have like-affordances (push buttons in ascending order or up/down arrows) and or mirror-imaged on either side of the display. But how many of us when running at 7 mph can distinguish the semiotics (text / symbol) on these buttons?

Or consider the case of Powering-off a Toyota Prius instead of putting it in Park? (both Power and Park controls are "push button" controls with like-affordances!)

Toyota Prius: Power and Park have the same affordances ("push"). When one is not paying sufficient attention, one is prone to commit the "Error of Commission." Pushing one for the other.

Going forward, we may need a mixed-modal UI that might present multiple ways of interacting with technology to accommodate what comes most naturally to the user based on his/her situation, context and current workload. This also is contingent on the levels of automation and intelligence that might be incorporated in a machine, device or appliance.

In the meantime let's keep in mind, as good as touch screens get to be, their qualities should not be viewed as the "Midas Touch" for user-interaction design.

In closing, every one of us must remember Bill Buxton's primary axiom for design in general and user-interfaces in particular:

"Everything is best for something and worst for something else."

The author, Moin Rahman, is a Principal Scientist at HVHF Sciences, LLC. 

For more information, please visit:

http://hvhfsciences.com/

http://www.linkedin.com/in/moinrahman


HVHF Article Archive: http://hvhfsciences.blogspot.com/


E-mail: hvhf33322@gmail.com

Additional Reading

5 Annoying Things About Today's Car Stereos

"SITUATION AWARENESS" - Say what?

...whose situation awareness are we talking about?: human, sensor, radio, computer or infrastructure?

"Situation Awareness" along with "intuitive design" have become buzz words in the Critical Communications industry. One finds these words a lot these days in marketing brochures, sales talk and presentations at technology tradeshows. Claims are made that one needs to buy Product X or Technology Y because it enhances the situation awareness of either a firefighter at the tactical edge or an utility control room operator in the backend of a system.

SITUATION AWARENESS - "Say what?"

The question is, if someone is using these terms -- "situation awareness" or "intuitive" and "user-friendly" user-interfaces -- for marketing purposes, do they provide any human factors-based measures to back it up. Hard, empirical data that quantifies the supposedly enhanced situation awareness of a mission critical professional who might be on the fireground, or back in the control room of a nuclear power plant?

"nah!" 

Rarely does one hear the details about situation awareness, or SA:

• the process by which it is acquired.
• the nature of SA as a product - 
• i.e., perception of task relevant data; its comprehension towards enhancing the operator's SA of system state (cohorts, teams, commander's intent, condition of the machine agent(s) or system); that is, what they -- the co-worker, team, systems -- are doing? why they are doing what they are doing? (just not information, but an understanding or knowledge of what's going on; Figure 1)
• projection of future states (e.g., estimated time for backup help to arrive; wind direction in a hour from now, of relevance to a wildland firefighter; readiness of trauma care center to receive casualties from an accident site in the next 30 min.)
• the measures or quantification of SA
• what did the operator become aware of which he was not aware of previously?; did he acquire this SA with effort (probed the system), or effortlessly? -- where a Smart System alerted him to the impending danger?  

Figure 1: Task-relevant Data / Information when comprehended turns into knowledge and, thus, enhances operator SA

Varieties of SA

SA certainly is not acquired easily by humans, even if it is in the immediate space or environment due to phenomenon such as inattentional blindness, attentional tunneling, cognitive distraction, or information overload.

Additionally, SA is not the sole dominion of individual humans. Members of a team can have SA about what's going on in the socio-technical system (Shared SA); An individual or team that is geographically distributed can have SA about different aspects of a system (Distributed SA). A machine or system can have SA about what other sub-systems or humans are doing (m2m; machine-to-machine communication), which radios have been registered on a critical comm. wireless network and their locations (Systems SA). Or when human and machine collaborate together to acquire SA, with a tacit acknowledgement that in certain aspects the machine is better than human and vice-versa, then, it would be Joint SA.

Acquisition of SA

To acquire SA of a situation, the following are required:

• Sensor 
• Transducer
• Computer 

As machinistic as the above may sound, it is not necessarily so. The above could very well be a human. For example in the case of a human: An eye or ear is a sensor. The nervous system is a transducer (takes the raw signal -- light or sound -- and converts it into a coded neural signal); the computer is the brain, where the signal is decoded and interpreted. "For example, a police officer on hearing a sound may react with: "Ah! what I heard was a gun shot. My partner should be in trouble!"

A self-driving car, or autonomous vehicle, is an example of a machine acquiring SA, where it may either choose to accelerate or brake at appropriate moments.

The only difference between human and a machine -- both, by the way are intelligent cognitive agents in their own right -- is the former excels in pattern recognition and novel situations; whereas the latter algorithmic thinking approach never tires nor loses vigilance due to monotony or having a hangover!

Three mini case studies: SA obtained and missed

Sandy Hook Elementary School Shooting

Figure 2: Children being evacuated from the Sandy Hook Elementary School by Connecticut Police

In the second deadliest mass shooting in American history, twenty students, ages 6 and 7, and six adults were killed at the Sandy Hook Elementary school on December 14, 2012.

Figure 3: A graphic depicting the site of the shooting. (CNN)

As soon as the shooting began, 911 began receiving calls. In this incident, teachers and the school custodian, were the eyes and ears ("sensors, transducers and computers") who were instrumental in describing and narrating the gruesome goings-on in Real Time & Real Space. This information thus transmitted via phone, by "humans" ["cognitive computing" at source and onsite], with emotive intonations and ambient sounds, were instrumental in building the SA of for law enforcement.  

In this case, it is hard to imagine if a machine agent could have equalled or surpassed the cognitive computing performed by human agents onsite with regards to facilitating SA acquisition to law enforcement. However, Joint SA, where surveillance video from classrooms along with the human narration of events might have been superior. Note: A human is really good at reading another human's (active shooter) intent.

Verdict: SA Obtained to the extent possible

Asiana Air Crash

A 16-year old girl who survived the crash of an Asiana Flight 214 in San Francisco was tragically killed by "multiple blunt injuries" when she was run over by a rescue vehicle. 

Figure 4: Asiana Crash at SFO in July 2012

This tragic accident was due to the fire engines quickly spraying thousands of gallons of water and foam, which seems to have obscured the driver’s view of a human figure on the tarmac. He was unaware (missed the first step of SA acquisition: sensing and perceiving) of the object/person in his vehicle's path.

Verdict: SA Disabled

Metro North Train Accident

The recent Metro North Train accident on the Hudson Line that resulted in fatalities was found to be travelling almost three times the permitted speed (82 mph instead of less than 30 mph) into a turn. 

Figure 4: Metro-North train from Poughkeepsie to Grand Central Terminal, NYC Derailed in the Bronx, via NYT 

Both the driver who allegedly dozed-off and the train (emphasis added) itself were unaware that the train was overspeeding through the turn.  The Driver Alerter, a warning device for keeping the driver awake in the event he was drowsy, was not inside the cab in which the driver was located; nor did the system (train) have a Positive Train Control feature, a track signalling method where the train would have automatically reduced its speed as it approached the curve.  In this case, due to a combination of reasons, the Joint SA (driver + machine/system) was absent, which could be attributed as two major reasons for the accident, among other things.

Verdict: SA Unavailable

Say What to What Next?

SA is acquired by various means in different critical infrastructure domains (public safety, transportation, utilities, etc.).  When a complex socio-technical system is designed, with a number of components -- human agents to machine agents (sensors, radio, telemetry, computers, infrastructure, etc.) -- it is vitally important to set minimum requirements of SA for both human and machine.

Technology vendors should meet the requirements that are dictated by safety, human & system performance requirements under both normal & abnormal situations, and other mandates.  The SA requirements ("needs analysis") have to be identified through either cognitive ethnography or contextual inquiry in the pre-design phase; then, SA specifications set (qualitative and quantitative specifications); and verified through lab and field usability testing, including, live action prototype testing under various equilibrium and non-equilibrium system states (normal to heavy workload to high stakes / high stress situations).

If SITUATION AWARENESS is just used as a "term of art" during design, or as a marketing "buzz word" by a technology vendor, and if we place our trust in it without verification, then it is a great cause of concern. Then our own lack of SA (!) as designers, evaluators and end-users on the important issue of SA needs to be blamed! 

In closing, when a critical infrastructure, socio-technical system is designed, or if a technology vendor makes a claim that their technology enhances Situation Awareness for the first responder or driver, then, it is incumbent on us to verify the following:

• Varieties of SA required for system performance and/or delivered by technology
• Process for acquiring SA 
• SA as 'product' in terms of meeting specifications and fulfilling requirements
• Measurement of SA

The author, Moin Rahman, is a Principal Scientist at HVHF Sciences, LLC. He specializes in:

"Designing systems and solutions for human interactions when stakes are high, moments are fleeting and actions are critical."

For more information, please visit:

http://hvhfsciences.com/

http://www.linkedin.com/in/moinrahman

HVHF Article Archive: http://hvhfsciences.blogspot.com/

E-mail: hvhf33322@gmail.com

Human Factors Design of Onboard Critical Communication & Navigation technologies in Emergency Responder Vehicles

Performing any task under time pressure, leave alone high stakes, is hard enough. It gets harder when one is a driver; say, driving on a crowded freeway to the airport when we are running late to catch a flight.

Now let us switch roles and imagine that we are driving a first responder vehicle, a fire truck or an ambulance to the airport, in response to a major fire. Where initial reports suggest that many are seriously injured, which includes a few fatalities whose number might grow if the situation is not brought under control.  Needless to say, the sooner we get to the airport, more the lives that can be saved.

As an emergency responder our drive to the airport is filled with the percussive blare of the sirens wailing, lights flashing; including, a variety of in-vehicle radio communications (voice and data), which provide continuous updates to us, on issues ranging from coordination to what to expect on the scene. So that we are mentally, physically and organizationally prepared when we arrive on the scene.

An emergency response driver may have to participate in these communications as s/he must build a mental model of the unfolding emergency situation. He does this when driving at or above the speed limit, and deftly maneuvering the vehicle, through heavy traffic. Stated otherwise, the emergency vehicle driver's situational awareness of the road, traffic conditions and heading (navigation) should be above the norm to avoid collisions or getting lost -- which only delay the emergency response.

Distraction takes on an entirely different meaning when you compare the citizen-driver with that of the emergency vehicle driver.  However, you would be surprised to hear that for all the attention "distracted driving" has received with regards to the citizen / consumer car (texting, cell phones, etc.), the emergency vehicle has received little attention, if any, in research, design & engineering and the popular press.

The current approach to designing the emergency vehicle, be it a fire truck or a police car, is simply to pack it with more and more technology (2-way radios; data terminals; lights & siren controls; etc., etc.). Furthermore, in most cases, general consumer vehicles conceptualized and designed with very different goals, have been adapted (retrofitted) with emergency responder vehicle technology. It is akin to taking a pleasure yacht -- then stripping and retrofitting it with suitable technology and offensive capabilities -- to turn it into a navy frigate. (see below).

 Retrofitting a pleasure yacht to do the job of a naval frigate (USS Bainbridge, shown above) to patrol the pirate infested seas off the Horn of Africa is not the kind of solution that would be desired by the US Navy

Much needs to be done in the design of emergency responder vehicles. Just adding (literally) bells & whistles won't do.  They under serve the emergency responder due to poor ground-up human engineering and top-down human-system integration of technology within and without the vehicle -- compromising safety for all concerned.

Distracted Driving

Driver Distraction due to onboard technologies -- voice calls or text messaging on cellphones being the most ubiquitous culprit of our times -- has received widespread attention both in academic research and the popular media.  It is a very serious topic because a distracted driver can inflict great harm to him or herself, and others on the road.  Cell phones aside, there are many other interactions (and distractions) due to onboard technology, e.g., the entertainment system, navigation device, HVAC -- and other non-technology-related activities (eating to rubbernecking).

This is in the consumer world. But let us now dive deeper into the world of emergency responders.

Professional Emergency Responder Drivers

Emergency vehicles are driven by the need to deliver a quick response at the site of the incident or accident and/or transport injured people to the appropriate emergency medicine or trauma center. Public safety personnel (law enforcement, firefighting or EMS) who are charged with the delivery of on-scene, first line of response have to arrive in the shortest possible duration without compromising either their safety or that of citizens or property.  To accomplish this, first responders or emergency responders utilize various surface transportation modes (e.g., police car, motorbike, fire truck, ambulance).  More often than not, the emergency responder may also assume the role of the driver (a.k.a., EVO: Emergency Vehicle Operator); The EVO has to communicate, coordinate, collaborate, navigate and signal (C_3nS), to enable him/her to arrive at the right location; and develop the correct mental model and situation awareness a priori to enable him/her deliver the appropriate response.  Thus the visuo-spatial-cognitive demands placed on the EVO, due to the primary task of high velocity, tactical driving and high priority, secondary tasks (C_3nS) that must get done on the move, can be overwhelming due to the following reasons:

• Disparate human-machine interfaces (HMIs) or user-interfaces (UIs) and their spatial location of the various C_3nS technologies inside the cabin or cockpit (see Figure below).
• The emergency situation or danger-induced emotional modulation and impoverishment of cognition (a.k.a., High Velocity Human Factors; Rahman, 2007)

Emergency responder technologies (2-way radio communication, mobile data terminal, etc.) found in a police cruiser. Note the disparate human-machine interfaces and technologies, including their spatial locations.

Distracted Driving: The Emergency Responder Case

Several definitions for distracted driving have emerged over the years and there is no one generally acceptable definition (Trezise et al., 2006).  In its most basic essence, one of the best definitions for distracted driving is described as “attention given to a non-driving-related activity, typically to the detriment of driving performance” (Pettitt, Burnett, & Stevens, 2005). 

A vast cornucopia of research and literature on driver distraction, including reviews (e.g., Reagan, Lee and Young, 2009; Young & Regan, 2007), naturalistic studies (Dingus, et al., 2006), and distraction mitigation (Engstrom & Victor, 2009; Donmez, et al., 2008), which address the topic from multiple perspectives (theory, empirical research, modeling, design, engineering, etc.) in the consumer and commercial vehicular is available. However, there is a paucity of driver distraction research insofar EVOs are concerned.

Nevertheless, the issue of injuries and fatalities resulting due to emergency vehicle crashes has been recognized and has been reported (FEMA, 2004; USFA, 2011). Driver distraction and human factor elements of emergency vehicle operations have been recognized (FEMA, 2004; IAFC, et al., 2010) as safety issues and guidelines (policies & procedures) have been published.   No literature that report findings on driver distraction caused by in-vehicle emergency responder technologies – basic or applied research (simulator or naturalistic driving) – to my knowledge is available in the public domain. However, a recent initiative by the United States Fire Administration (USFA, 2011) was announced to initiate a public safety emergency vehicle study.

Emergency Responder vs. General Public Driver

Emergency responders differ from the general public drivers in a number of ways, given their overarching goal of arriving at the scene or transporting the patient to the hospital in the shortest possible duration; or in some cases, embarking on hot pursuits (law enforcement). These cognitive and behavioral differences, as it applies to the in-vehicle experience and driving, are listed below:

• Emergency event or [high speed] driving caused affective arousal (neural, hormonal, physiological) and its positive and negative modulation of perception, cognition and decision making (Rahman, 2011).
• Time pressure: high speed driving; distortion of time perception; and speed induced under-estimation of speed and trip related durations (Cœugnet, et al., 2013)
• Knowledge, skills and abilities specific to emergency vehicle operations (e.g., police officers; Coyne, 2000)
• Differences in vehicular platforms (motor bikes to heavy vehicles), between consumer/commercial vehicles and emergency responder vehicles, including in-vehicle technologies.
• Emergency responder drivers are usually not in a position to exhibit operational-level, compensatory behaviors on the primary task of driving, unlike regular drivers who, for example, may reduce their speed when performing secondary tasks (e.g., talking on the cell phone) [Young & Regan, 2007].

Research, Design & Engineering (RD&E) of Emergency Responder Vehicles

Consider fire trucks. Pumpers, ladders, rescuers and tanker trucks are highly customized creations for the Fire Department from an operational standpoint. A truck maybe fitted with a 2000 gallon tank or with a pump capable of delivering 500 GPM.  But scant attention is likely to have been paid to the in-vehicle technologies the crew and the driver have to interact with enroute to an incident. Same applies to a police car.  The communicate, coordinate, collaborate, navigate and signal (C_3nS) capabilities might have just been retrofitted. Driver distraction, human factors and social intra- and inter-crew(s) interfacing, during a mission within and between first responder agencies may not have been addressed at all.

The RD&E must move away from the current retrofitting paradigm of civilian vehicles. This neither serves the emergency responders, citizens nor industry as it compromises safety and results in poor efficiencies. From a business standpoint, the incentives are lacking for industry -- automobile manufacturers to emergency communication vendors -- to change this paradigm.  

As a first step, mobile radio and computing technologies that are currently being retrofitted into a range of vehicles should stop taking the one-size fits all approach. Their design should be considered from the standpoint of what they need to do -- and assist EVOs and first responders in transit -- from an emergency communication and information transaction standpoint without causing "cognitive distractions" (taking the mind off the road and/or other higher priority tasks pertaining to driving and navigation.) Next, their user-interface design should go beyond run-of-the-mill ergonomics -- such as where to place knobs, size of push buttons or graphics of the screen -- but should also consider the cognitive, social and affective aspect of interaction brought about by high velocity human factors / HVHF (stress-induced emotional modulation of cognitive and perceptual capabilities of the body and the brain). 

Ultimately, creative business models, public-private partnerships, and human factors standards and guidelines are required to design emergency vehicles ground-up that deliver unrivalled safety and utility. This is contrast to the piecemeal and ad hoc retrofitting of consumer or commercial vehicles that is done today to transform them into emergency responder vehicles. 

In the engineering world, the vehicle Controller Area Network (CAN) interface is designed with great attention to detail so all digital components in the automobile work flawlessly, lest they cause a critical malfunction resulting in a safety hazard. Now the time has come to pay equal, if not more, attention to the emergency responder vehicle Human-Machine Interface (HMI). This is to ensure that emergency responder vehicle's onboard technologies do not result in driver distraction -- compromising safety -- where the emergency responder vehicle ends-up costing lives instead of saving lives.

Moin Rahman is a Principal Scientist at HVHF Sciences, LLC. He specializes in:

"Designing systems and solutions for human interactions when stakes are high, moments are fleeting and actions are critical."

For more information, please visit:

http://hvhfsciences.com/

http://www.linkedin.com/in/moinrahman

HVHF Article Archive: http://hvhfsciences.blogspot.com/

E-mail: moin.rahman@hvhfsciences.com

Key References 

Cœugnet, S., Miller, H., Anceaux, F., & Naveteur, J. (2013). How do time pressure drivers estimate speed and time? Accident Analysis & Prevention, Vol. 55, 211-218.

Coyne, P. (2000). Roadcraft: The Police Drivers Manual. London: HMSO.

Dingus, T.A., Klauer, S.G., Neale, V.L., Petersen, A., Lee, S.E., Sudweeks, J., et al. (2006). The 100-car Naturalistic Driving Study, Phase II: Results of the 100-Car field experiment (Tech. Rep. No. DOT HS 810 593). Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Donmez, B., Boyle, L.N., & Lee, J.D. (2008). Mitigating driver distraction with retrospective and concurrent feedback. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 40, 776-786.

Eisenberg, C. (2006). SLP-11: Law Enforcement Vehicle Pursuits - Policies, Training, Tactics and Technology. Retrieved on May 13, 2013, from http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/f2088557-2016-418e-8f5e-8f6e87635200/eisenberg,-clyde-paper-pdf.aspx

Engstrom, J., & Victor, T. (2009). Real-time distraction countermeasures. In M.A. Regan, J.D. Lee, & K.L. Young (Eds.), Driver distraction: Theory, effects, and mitigation (pp. 465-484). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.

FEMA (2004). FA 272: Emergency Vehicle Safety Initiative.

Hedlund, J. (2006). International Conference on Distracted Driving. Summary of Proceedings and Recommendations. International Conference on Distracted Driving. October 2005.

IAFC, AFL-CIO & CLC (2010). Best Practices for Emergency Vehicle and Roadway Operations Safety in the Emergency Services. Washington, DC: Authors.

Moore, G.A. (1999). Crossing the Chasm: Marketing and Selling High-Tech Products to Mainstream Customers. New York: HarperBusiness

McGehee, D.V. (2011). The Building Blocks of Driver Distraction Policy. Ergonomics in Design, Vol. 19(4), 25-27.

Pettitt, M., Burnett, G., & Stevens, A. (2005). Defining driver distraction. Paper presented at World Congress on Intelligent Transport Systems, San Francisco, CA.

Rahman, M. (2007). High Velocity Human Factors: Human factors in mission critical domains in Nonequilibrium. In Proceedings of the Human factors and Ergonomics 51st Annual Meeting (pp.273-277). Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society.

Rahman, M., Balakrishnan, G., & Bergin, T. (2011). Designing Human-Machine Interfaces for Naturalistic Perceptions, Decisions and Actions occurring in Emergency Situations. Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science. Vol. 13(3), 358-379.

Rahman, M. (2012). Emergency Medical Responders and Physicians: Diagnostics, Decision Making and Therapeutic Care in High Stakes Situations. Proceedings of the 2012 Symposium of Human Factors and Ergonomics in Healthcare. Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society.

Regan, M.A., Lee, J.D., & Young, K.L. (2009). Driver Distraction: Theory, effects, and mitigation. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.

Trezise, I., Stoney, E. G., Bishop, B., Eren, J., Harkness, A., Langdon, C., & Mulder, T. (2006). Report of the road safety committee on the inquiry into driver distraction. Rep. No. 209. Melbourne, Victoria, Australia: Road Safety Committee, Parliament of Victoria.

USFA (2011). USFA, Justice Department Initiate Public Safety Emergency Vehicle Safety Study. Retrieved on May 8, 2013, from http://www.usfa.fema.gov/media/press/2011releases/102411.shtm

Young, K. & Regan, M. (2007). Driver distraction: A review of the literature. In: I.J. Faulks, M. Regan, M. Stevenson, J. Brown, A. Porter & J.D. Irwin (Eds.). Distracted driving. Sydney, NSW: Australasian College of Road Safety. Pages 379-405.

Creative Disruptions (or lack thereof) in Mission Critical Communications Technology

In this post, I will go out on a limb and make the audacious claim that the first and, thus far, the biggest "bottom-up" creative disruptor in mission critical communications industry (a.k.a., First Responder communications) has been the elimination of the "runner." That is, the messenger who relayed messages between the command post and the front lines. Legend has it that the most famous runner of all time was Pheidippides who ran from the battlefield of Marathon to Athens, in 490 BC, to relay the message that the Persians were defeated.

Then came the mother of all "creative disruptions" insofar mission critical communications were concerned: Wireless communication.

Thanks to the 2-way radio. The job of the Runner has become obsolete and "marathon" has turned into a competitive sport. But it took a tragedy concerning "Public Safety" --  a lack of, and poor, radio communication capabilities on the high seas, which resulted in the sinking of the Titanic -- for the first major federal legislation concerning wireless communications to be enacted into law. It was the Radio Act of 1912. And, public safety, has never been the same since (for the better).  However, it was the impetus of WWII and the realization by the US Signal Corps on the importance of portable radio communications for the dismounted soldier, which resulted in the commercialization of the first generation of handheld portable radios.

Handie-Talkie (SCR-536) military radio - circa 1945 – the first model of a hand held two-way radio ever produced.
(manufacturer was Galvin Manufacturing which became Motorola during WWII)

Success in mission critical domains (first responders, transportation, energy generation, healthcare, etc.) is contingent on timely transmission, receipt and comprehension of mission-relevant information. This could range from runner-based relayed communication, semaphores (hand signals), smoke signals to wireless radio communication (voice, data or homing signal); the latter is invaluable because of its lightening speed. Radio communication not only saves lives, it also serves as a"force-multiplier" as it enhances the effectiveness and efficiency of work done and services delivered by first responders.

Now lets explore mission critical communication in general and the extent to which "two-way radio" communication has evolved from its humble beginnings over the last 50 years. This is to find out what and where is the state of the art of radio communication; and have there been any creative disruptions since the advent of the wireless radio in the mission critical domain.

Bottom-Up Creative Disruptor vs. Top-Down Innovation 

I define a bottom-up creative disruption as one where the fundamental nature of how work ought to be performed -- to make it safer, cleaner, efficient and effective with multifold gains -- is realized with a game changing technology. Wireless radio communication was certainly one such game changing technology for mission critical professionals. In fact, it was such a revolutionary technology it found its way into the consumer market, and its cousin, the cellular phone, became a wild success.

Now to top-down innovations.  These are mostly small, but very much necessary, incremental changes that make a technology better. In the two-way radio case, those familiar with industry jargon, will point out such innovations: conventional to trunking; analog to digital; single to multiband; Simulcast; interoperability between different vendor equipment (APCO P25 Standard); etc. Many of these top-down innovations were necessitated to exploit the extremely valuable and crowded Radio Frequency (RF) spectrum -- and also to deliver some benefits to first responders in the field.

In a similar vein, the consumer cellular phone has seen many such top-down innovations (FDMA, CDMA, TDMA, GPRS, 3GPP, 4G LTE), but has also vastly benefited from a number of bottom-up creative disruptors. These range from color screens, multi-touch user-interfaces, speech recognition, location-based services, GPS, Internet and an "app" rich ecosystem,  and much more. A good number of these were driven by the need to meet the end-users wants and needs; and/or out think the consumers themselves to provide them with services they could not have imagined. For instance, it is said the legendary former Apple CEO, the late Steve Jobs, could imagine and intuit what the (consumer) end-users' digital interests and pursuits would be or should be, even though they (customers) wouldn't know it until the they experienced it! In the consumer space, an open market and intense competition, resulted in many bottom-up creative disruptions. Thanks to titans, past and present, such as Motorola, Nokia, Blackberry, Apple, Samsung, among others.

The Revolution in Consumer Communication Technology vs. the slow Evolution in Mission Critical Comms.

Note: The devices are shown for representational purposes; the pictures themselves only tell less than half the story, as the technology within and without (network and ecosystem) has much more to do with creative disruptions and innovations in their respective market verticals.

Have Mission Critical Communications withered on the Vine?

For some, the above question is a heresy. How dare one ask such a question...? But have we seen the kind of user-based, bottom-up creative disruptions in the mission critical communications industry that are on par with the consumer communication market? The basic anatomy of the mission critical radio has pretty much remained the same over the years. The user-experience has not really become intuitive and user-friendly, particularly under High Velocity Human Factors (HVHF) conditions -- say, in a high stakes, dangerous and highly stressful situations. (In HVHF states the user's cognitive capacity is diminished due to task overload and other threats; there is insufficient cognitive bandwidth to interact with technology.)

At the end of the day when there is a loss of life and/or assets, the fire fighter or the police officer is blamed because he didn't know how to get to the tactical talk net (group or channel). Or the buck is passed around and "lack of training" gets blamed. But what about the root cause: the design of the portable communication radio or the network that supports it? Some daring visionaries, from industry, regulatory bodies, and first responders agencies, have thought about it, and have tried hard to improve the utility of the radio, but for any number of reasons have been stymied.

These critical radio problems (device and network infrastructure) were brought into the limelight in two recent incidents that ended in loss of life: the Navy yard shooting and the Yarnell Hill wildland fire.

It is important to note that adding a color display and making bigger, bulkier knobs or best-in-class Push-to-Talk buttons with a "sweet spot" to a mission critical radio does not solve the kind of problem that confront the first responder. Certainly, they make the specific I/O interface easier to look, twiddle or press.  But what is the point of making a fundamentally unintuitive product that lacks critical utility when that ability to communicate is lost in critical moments? The reasons could range from lack of connectivity to the inability to figure out -- particularly, under highly stressful situations when the ability to think is altered due to danger -- on how to get to the right channel on the radio. Or stated in operational terms get to the the closest fellow first responder, with the appropriate skill set, say, a paramedic, from one's own team or another department.  Remember "moments" time matters in first response. A severe arterial bleed could take a life in a matter of less than 5 minutes. Bluntly stated showroom usability of buttons and knobs does not necessarily equal to actual utility delivered on the fireground, or when taking fire in a SWAT operation.

Thus one is forced to conclude that mission critical communication technology lags and not leads, both in absolute and relative terms (compared to consumer comms.), in terms of what ought to be done. For one, no noteworthy innovation that was born in the mission critical space has gone to the consumer markets in the recent past. Whereas innovations from the consumer space (e.g., Google Glass) are knocking at the doors of mission critical. There are many reasons for the paucity of innovation in the mission critical space. They range from poor economies of scale, lack of viable business models, insufficient or skewed competition, insufficient hardcore human factors engineering related R&D due to lack of a vision or funding, absence of a strong partnership among first responder agencies/end-users, vendors and regulatory bodies, among others. (Recently Politico alleged about special interests trying to impede the proposed Public Safety Broadband Network.)

Creative Disruptions in Mission Critical Communications

The need of the hour in mission critical communications is not so much about getting the police officer an iPad or a Google Glass. They may have a role, assuming they are not distractors but truly deliver utility during normal and abnormal situations.

What really should matter, as a first step, is a thorough understanding of how first responder work is best done before we think of "engineering" a solution. In many instances, first responder work is done inefficiently or dangerously either to compensate for the limits of technology or inspite of it. To understand the "socio-technical" aspects of a firefighter, paramedic or police officers work one needs cognitive ethnographers, social and human factors researchers study their work in real time, in the field -- and in context. (Questionnaires or focus groups should be used to support field work not as substitutions; by themselves questionnaires reveal very little.) This type of work is done by teaming-up with first responders (the actual end-users and not purchasing decision makers in first responder agencies) and including them in "participatory" design exercises.

At a high level, one needs to understand the following factors, their interplay, and how goal driven tasks are best accomplished.

1. First responder physical and cognitive demands
2. Nature of first response, situation or context
3. Individual and team task execution needs; inter / intra departmental coordination and collaboration

Data collection from the above described field work, followed by interpretation and ideation should drive the discovery of solutions. The solutions could range from training, technology, organizational factors to operating procedures. In other words, technology is one among other factors.

Insofar technology is concerned it may or may not involve using or adapting commercially off the shelf technologies; or it may require something new to be invented resulting in a creative disruption.  Such an approach, would increase efficiency of first response and protect first responders. For example, a firefighter should be made aware before he enters the building whether he would be losing his ability to communicate (transmit and/or receive). Simply put, an inability to receive a command to evacuate may have life threatening consequences.  There are several more such issues (known and unknown) that hobble first responder communications and put them into danger. Unfortunately, these problems can neither be solved with a bigger, better ergonomic knob nor the world's best push-to-talk button; or for that matter augmented reality afforded by a head mounted display such as Google Glass.

So what needs to be done? Part of the answer lies in product design (bottom-up, creative disruptions and top-down innovation). But is there an impetus or an incentive for creative disruption in the mission critical industry market vertical?: yes and no. I will reserve this discussion for another article.

In the meantime, I solicit feedback, and would like to hear your thoughts on the state of the art of mission critical communication.

Moin Rahman is a Principal Scientist at HVHF Sciences, LLC. He specializes in:

"Designing systems and solutions for human interactions when stakes are high, moments are fleeting and actions are critical."

For more information, please visit:

http://hvhfsciences.com/

http://www.linkedin.com/in/moinrahman

HVHF Article Archive: http://hvhfsciences.blogspot.com/

E-mail: moin.rahman@hvhfsciences.com