Police Decision Making: Science, Policy and Practice for the Use of Deadly Force

Once the proverbial "pull the trigger" decision is made either to let out a Verbal Volley or Fire a Single Shot, it is almost impossible to apply the brakes. The outcome resulting from this could be a frayed relationship with a colleague at work or a loss of life on the streets during police work. 

The last one was seen recently with the police shooting in Ferguson, Missouri, where Officer Darren Wilson fatally shot and killed 18-year old, Michael Brown -- in addition to the precious loss of life of a young man, there were repercussions from riots to citizens' loss of confidence in the police itself. 

DECISION MAKING IN LIFE THREATENING SITUATIONS

Research in evolutionary psychology and cognitive science show the underlying reasons as to why we humans act in a preemptive manner (use force), particularly when life and limb are at stake, even before all the facts are ascertained. They are:

1. Time pressure
2. Physical survival under threat (or) loss of property 
3. (1 & 2 causing) Danger-induced emotional arousal and biased decision making that favors self preservation. 

The simplest way to describe the above is by analyzing the structure of the human brain. Our brain carries the baggage of our evolutionary history, from the time we evolved from reptiles to small mammals and eventually the primates that we are today (homosapiens: Latin for "Wise Man" or "Thinking Man"!). This is revealed in the structure of our triune (3-layered) brain, where the reptilian brain is at the lowest, followed by the Intermediate brain at the next higher level, and the Rational Brain at the highest level.  

Our base instincts pertaining to self preservation and aggression (including quenching hunger, sexual drive, bowel and bladder functions), are largely governed by the primitive or reptilian brain. Whereas mental processes that concern higher-order thinking and symbolic manipulation, say, composing music or reading a map, operate in the rational brain.

So in other words, we the homosapiens, the supposed "Wise Man" are not really WISE when it is to do with  decision making when survival or self preservation are at stake. 

Furthermore, when it is a matter of survival, we would rather assume that the perceived threat is true (or a positive), in the spur of the moment, even if turns out to be false after examination or later reflection. 

Why?  It is better to be wrong than to be sorry (after the fact, say, injury or death). 

Evolutionary psychologists call it the "Snake in the Grass Effect." For example, if we were walking in the woods and get a feeling that something is rubbing on our shin, our non-conscious, reptilian brain makes us jump back even before we get a chance to determine the source for that feeling. Later examination might reveal that we just happened to rub our shin on the bark of a tree giving us that "scaly feeling"! Thus, the "Snake in the Grass Effect."

If in reality that "scaly feeling" turned out to be a tree bark that caused us to jump back in alarm, then, it was a false positive; however, regardless of the error, we have not lost a thing. Perhaps our heart rate and stress hormones levels momentarily elevated due to the hardwired flee or fight response. On the other hand, what it if that "scaly feeling" really happened to be snake? And it is quite possible that on that rare occasion, it might have well turn out to be a real rattle snake with scales! (True Positive). Jumping back in alarm, may actually have helped us survive!

Snake in the Grass Effect

SURVIVAL: DECISION MAKING ON THE POLICING BEAT

How does all this play into policing and decision making?

Police officers are human, too, and succumb to the same decision making processes described above that are governed by the reptilian brain and false positives (snake in the grass effect). Furthermore, their decision making maybe affected due to implicit biases when a suspected person belongs to another racial or ethnic category. Alas, that is how the brain is wired given its evolutionary history.

BUT, this is no excuse for police officers to open fire on innocent citizens. To prevent this, police departments have policies such as Use of Force Continuum (picture below), as to when the use force is appropriate and, thus, can be escalated. (A recent addition are body-worn cameras to deter the officer from unwarranted use of force.)

The classic definition for the philosophy of policing, which drives much of training and policing practice in the US is informed by the scholar Egon Bittner's (1985) classic paper*. He observed:

"The police are best understood as a mechanism for distributing nonnegotiable coercive force in accordance with an intuitive grasp of situational threats to social order. This definition of the police role presents a difficult moral problem; setting the terms by which a society dedicated to peace can institutionalize the exercise of force...."

But how does a police officer, in high stakes situations, get an intuitive grasp of situation threats? And how does one prevent false positives, particularly when transitioning from Level Four use of force to Level Five. And, in practical terms, under stressful situations, when danger-induced emotional arousal (reptilian brain), drives much of cognition, is it even possible to recall the Use of Force Continuum? 

These questions need to be asked and researched and solutions developed by taking a multi-pronged approach in the following areas:

• Selection and recruitment procedures of police officers (by taking into consideration individual profiles (psychological and  personality attributes); and appropriate screening to determine whether a candidate has innate or maladaptive cognitive and physical abilities for policing).
• Police training curriculum and methods (techniques and simulations to impart knowledge, skills, abilities to tamp down hardwired responses such as the "Snake in the Grass Effect").
• Policies, procedures and protocols (on use of force; buddy-system; back-ups).
• Technologies that monitor and/or augment officers' contextual-intelligence (person & place) and real-time situational awareness.

Before I conclude this article, I want us to consider a hypothetical question, which is both daring and crazy at once, a heresy even to utter in the context of policing in the United States:

Would having unarmed police officers conduct community policing reduce the TOTAL number of unwarranted killings -- loss of lives -- of both Citizens and Police Officers?

I am not sure what the answer would be. Because, it is unacceptable for any loss of innocent life, be that of an officer or a citizen. 

But by asking the above question, I raise a plausible solution (pointers, really) in terms of officer recruitment, training, police comms. & computing technology and policy.  Because from a human factors standpoint an unarmed police officer should have built-up extraordinary abilities to diffuse a situation, without the use of force.  In other words, our hypothetical unarmed police officer needs to have the following:

• high level of skills in communications (persuasion/dissuasion, body & verbal language); 
• expertise in naturalistic decision making (ability to quickly discern the type of situation, then engage or disengage from person & incident -- particularly in an one-on-one situation where there is uncertainty about the level of threat and the suspect's desire to inflict bodily harm on the police officer);
• augmenting pre-engagement decision making with technology (sensors, warnings, pre-engagement alerts) that enhance contextual intelligence and situational awareness and enables the right go/no-go decision;
• Socio-psychological abilities (command presence, language, tone of voice, community engagement) & physical fitness and expertise in martial arts 

All of the above, in my opinion, can contribute in the officer maintaining the locus of control and confidence. (Often times, it is a loss of confidence or fear, which leads to pulling the trigger.)

The take-away message is policing requires men and women with extraordinary capabilities and skillsets in multiple dimensions. They not only need physical strength, but also wit and wisdom on the fly. In other words, they need to be real HOMOSAPIENS, a.k.a., "the Wise Man" that we are capable of being when our rational brain is operational. What can and should be done by policy makers, researchers, recruiters, trainers, commanders, and actual policing practice, so that we have "wise men and women" police officers on the ground? And, more importantly, can it be realized in policing culture and practice quickly enough to prevent the next Ferguson? 

About the author:

Moin Rahman, is a Principal Scientist at HVHF Sciences, LLC. He specializes in:

"Designing systems and solutions for human interactions when stakes are high, moments are fleeting and actions are critical."

For more information, please visit:

http://hvhfsciences.com/

http://www.linkedin.com/in/moinrahman

HVHF Article Archive: http://hvhfsciences.blogspot.com/

E-mail: moin.rahman@hvhfsciences.com

Preventing Tragedies in Wildland Fire Fighting

We mourn the loss of 19 of the very best and brave wildland fire fighters, the Granite Mountain Hotshots*, at Yarnell Hill (Prescott), Arizona. As painful as this loss was, it behooves us, the scientific research community, to advance our understanding of fire science and fire fighter human factors to prevent such future tragedies. 

*Hotshots are an elite group of wildland firefighters, with a demanding regimen of physical and fire science training. They carry around 40 - 50 lbs. of gear, food, water, fire shelters, etc., and are dropped-off as a small group, where they fight the fire on their own. For example, they create a fire line, by starving the fire of its fuel (getting rid of brush, dry chaparral, brittle oak brush etc.) to keep the fire from spreading. They have a lookout who observes the wind patterns, weather, progression of fire, etc., on the fireground in real time, to help the firefighters develop their strategy and tactics -- and keep them safe. (A video of the Granite Mountain Hotshots that was filmed in April 2012 is available below this article.)

Started by a lightning strike on Friday, the fire spread to 8,000 acres. (Via NY Times)

Given the nature of the events at Yarnell Hill -- a burnover where the wind radically shifted suddenly and the flames changed direction without warning engulfing the Granite Mountain Hotshots -- posing the following research questions and finding answers may close the gap in our current knowledge on wildland firefighting. Thus enhancing risk assessment, situation awareness and decision making of firefighters and their commanders, supplemented with advances in communication, sensing and computing technologies that truly deliver utility, usability and safety to the crew on the fireground.

• Computational modeling of fire fighting by treating it as a physical & socio-technical complex systems. This complex system will consist of various heterogeneous agents (physical and human) -- fuel source (for the fire), heat intensity, oxygen levels, wind patterns and fire fighters' characteristics (knowledge, skills, abilities, training, physical fitness, cognitive readiness, experience -- i.e., capabilities & limitations). Furthermore, the human / organizational (socio-technical) element will encompass operational strategies and tactics (protocols), equipment and machines.  Thus these various agents produce their own signals and interact with other agents at the boundaries (a.k.a., signal-boundaries of a "dynamic generated systems" in complexity and chaos theory). This modeling may enable the commander and his/her crew to predict in near real time the behavior of the fire and effort/resources needed to starve it off fuel and oxygen to bring it under control; advise received, as needed from a central command center, who develop a macro level situation awareness with computational model providing proactive decision support;

The above picture from AZCentral.com

• Advance research in fire fighter (human) sensemaking, situation awareness and naturalistic decision making of complex scenarios in volatile, high stakes and complex settings to understand the fidelity and validity of situation assessment. Understand how firefighters / commander makes a decision on how to engage or disengage from a fire and how do they perceive risks (loss / gain) and probabilities to inform their decision making in real time.

Note the communication gear, the 2-way radio in front -- and inside the radio pocket -- of the harness on the Fire Jacket. 

(Communication and Computing technology is discussed in the next bullet point)

"Rick Cowell, the 55-year-old superintendent of the Tahoe Hotshots, addressing his crew during the Stafford blaze." *Photographer:* Kyle Dickman  via Outside Magazine

• Signal and imaging technologies (aerial and geospatial sensing and analysis), including command and control (radio communications and computing), that best integrate human and systems to enhance safety. The design of radio communications between the "lookout" and the "hotshots" on the fire ground -- as well as group communications between centralized command & control, lookout and hotshots (shared situation awareness) -- are vital to enhance situation awareness. In other words, comprehend the current conditions, particularly risks and hazards arising due to the fuel source and wind/weather patterns; and, more importantly, project the future trajectory and progression of the fire. Furthermore, the utility and use of large screen, data / computing devices on the fireground for use by the lookout or the hotshot squad leader, where data is fed from ground / aerial sensors (e.g., dropsondes) and video/images from central servers, should be investigated. Even though, this technology may provide valuable thermal and weather intelligence, it also poses the danger of cognitive / attentional tunneling and information overload causing the firefighters to loose situation awareness of dangers in the immediate physical  vicinity.

Thus it is vital to formulate the right research questions, find answers in terms of training and technologies, to prevent future tragedies resulting from volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous factors, time stress -- that are inherent to wild land fire fighting.

Video: Granite Mountain Hotshots

 

This video of the Granite Mountain Hotshots was filmed in April 2012. Chillingly, it shows the crew practicing the deployment of their fire shelters (aluminum foil and silica sacks that reflect radiant heat). Prior to this tragic and wicked conflagration the Prescott Fire Department -Granite Mountain Interagency Hotshot Crew had never before been forced to deploy shelters in a fire. The LAST RESORT... Fire shelters have saved the lives of nearly 300 firefighters since 1977. Story credit: Stand with Arizona standwitharizona.com 

Thanks to -- and via -- Brotherhood of Fire 

News Articles

NPR: "19 Firefighters Killed In Ariz. Wildfire Called Deadliest In Decade"

PBS Newshour Video Report:  
Part 1: Ariz. Inferno Kills Elite Firefighters

Part 2: Firefighters Who Perished in Arizona Faced High Heat, 'One of the Hardest' Tasks

AZ Central: Wildfire experts: More than 1 factor spawned Yarnell tragedy

Further Reading:
Outside Magazine, on being a Hotshot: IN THE LINE OF WILDFIRE 

About the author:

Moin Rahman is a Principal Scientist at HVHF Sciences, LLC. He specializes in:

"Designing systems and solutions for human interactions when stakes are high, moments are fleeting and actions are critical."

http://hvhfsciences.com/

http://www.linkedin.com/in/moinrahman 

E-mail: moin.rahman@hvhfsciences.com

Inadvertent Police Shootings of Unarmed Citizens: Normal Error, At-risk Behavior, or Reckless Behavior?

Officers belonging to the New York Police Department (NYPD) over the last two decades have been involved in inadvertent shootings of unarmed citizens (e.g., Amadou Diallo, Sean Bell), which have resulted in a tragic loss of innocent lives.  The most recent incident occurred on Oct. 4, which resulted in the fatal shooting of Noel Polanco, 22, who was shot by a 14-year veteran detective, Hassan Hamdy, 39, assigned to the elite Emergency Service Unit. Needless to say, these incidents not only besmirch the reputation of a police department whose function in a Republic is to protect and serve its citizens but also cause irreparable harm to police-community relations. 

Mr. Polanco's Honda was pulled over on the Grand Central Parkway because, the police said, it had cut off their vehicles.

The questions raised by these tragic incidents are many. But one crucial question that is of great interest to the human factors/cognitive scientist is what may have caused the police officer NOT to realize that the citizen was unarmed, meant no harm -- yet pursued a course of action (use of deadly force) that was incompatible with the situation that was encountered (unarmed civilian). Put in human factors jargon (taxonomy [Marx, 2008]), did the police officer commit a:
Normal Error: Inadvertent action (slip, lapse, mistake)?
At Risk Behavior: A choice: risk not recognized or believed justified?
Reckless Behavior: Conscious disregard of unreasonable risk?

The job of a police officer is certainly not easy. He must accomplish speedy and successful "sensemaking" (making sense of one's experience and giving it meaning) and situated-social cognition (reading and interpreting the intent of a civilian who may appear to be posing a threat) in a high stakes situation, where incorrect sensemaking may end-up costing his own life. 

So the question is, how should the citizens of a republic recruit a police officer with the right type of psychological profile who will not indulge in Reckless Behavior, legally arm him; then ensure that he his trained so that he doesn't become a victim to his own poor choices of At Risk Behavior or commit Normal Error? This is also dictated by the relationship between a police officer and citizen through what is referred to as the "Power Distance": Power Distance is one among five dimensions of a culture identified by the sociologist Geert Hofstede who defined it as: 

"the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally."

The power distance may vary between the police and citizenry. It may be very large in a police state, moderate in a country like the United States (this may vary from city to city), and relatively low in European democracies such as Great Britain  The abuse and misuse of power distance are serious problems where they can cause loss of life in risky socio-technical systems such as police departments, military, aviation or hospitals as they set expectations on how personnel (or the bureaucracy_ should perform within (in-group) and interact without (out-group). Problems caused by power distance are typically symptoms of a decrepit organizational culture that is marked by poor management, training and operational protocols.

Having introduced the above concepts, let us now consider Mr. Polanco's shooting through them. Early reports on this shooting indicate that "Mr. Polanco was driving erratically, switching lanes while speeding, and twice cutting off two police trucks carrying nine officers of the Emergency Service Unit..." The narrative given by a passenger in Mr. Polanco's car indicates that the officers committed an act of road rage, allegedly losing their temper when their authority (power distance) was challenged on the road (Mr. Polanco cutting off the two police trucks, twice). This may have been exacerbated when the police officers approached Mr. Polanco's Honda, which was forced to a stop, and ordered those inside the car to show their hands -- and Mr. Polanco didn't comply. According to the Times, in an interview,  a passenger, Diane Deferrari, in the Honda said that Mr. Polanco "...had no time to comply and that, in that instant Detective Hamdy fired the shot."

It is too early to conclude as to what may caused Detective Hamdy to fire that fatal shot. Was it Reckless Behavior? Or a case of Normal Error or At-Risk Behavior brought about by poor sensemaking? Some may be inclined to lean towards Reckless Behavior, even though this was the very first shot that Detective Hamdy fired in his 14-year career as a police officers. But they may point to the two lawsuits that were brought against him for allegedly not following proper procedures when apprehending suspects. On the other hand, the portrait of Detective Hamdy is somewhat complex, because earlier this year, he was also accorded the status of a hero as he helped rescue five people in a burning apartment building.

One may also wonder whether Detective Hamdy's prior professional background in the military, which has a very different conception of the use of fatal force and power distance as opposed to policing, may have influenced his decision making in the situation discussed above. (Detective Hamdy served four years in the Marine Corps, rising to the level of sergeant in an artillery division, and earned medals for good behavior.) Furthermore, did Detective Hamdy's current assignment  in the Tactical Apprehension Unit (TAU) of the NYPD, a very stressful and risky operational setting -- that may employ somewhat of a larger Power Distance than typical policing on the street -- play a role in this shooting? What might be referred to as a negative transfer of skills, experience and training, which [TAU] is geared towards taking on criminals and gangs to a situation that was of a different nature (unsafe vehicular operation on the road of a driver) get the better of him?

Next, one may also attribute to the inappropriate decision making of Detective Hamdy to issues raised by High Velocity Human Factors (HVHF). Did the autonomic arousal -- what is termed as "predatory cardiovascular reactions" (much like the arousal a predator experiences when chasing a prey) -- that was triggered-off by the adrenalin released in the car chase have a role? Perhaps, this autonomic arousal didn't make him pause (sensemaking) before opening fire? For instance, giving consideration to the possibility that Mr. Polanco may not have heard the officers' orders to raise his hands. Or was there a real threat that was perceived by Detective Hamdy when Mr. Polanco didn't raise his hands from the steering wheel? (An earlier report indicates that a Power Drill was found on the passenger seat of the vehicle.) Did danger-induced emotional arousal distort the facts [perceptual mechanisms such as the "snake in the grass effect"], much like the officers who shot Amadou Diallo, who mistook his black wallet for a gun? We may not know until the inquiry is complete.

In the meantime, there is one thing, that is, training, which certainly needs to be revisited in the best interests of all concerned. Professionals in a variety of professions are trained under the rubric referred to as KSAs (Knowledge-Skills-Attitudes) to do the job. They can be briefly described as follows in the context of doing a job, whether it be flying a plane or being a police officer:
Knowledge: Need to know
Skills: Need to do
Attitudes: Need to feel

Training of professionals is typically very good on the first two (K & S) items. But it is always a challenge with the last one, "Attitudes." In policing, particularly in a time compressed, high stakes situations an officer may not have enough time for analysis of the situation, rational thought and decision making. He literally has to go with somatic situation awareness (see publications), or what is referred to as "gut feeling" in the vernacular. How does one "train" gut feeling to make those right decisions when danger is imminent and the moments are fleeting? This issue has been studied under the auspices of HVHF by bringing to bear both evolutionary psychology and neuroscience. The process of interpreting this body of science and translating it into pedagogical curriculum to inculcate the ability in an officer through feeling (Attitude: need to feel) and interpreting the intent (situated-social cognition) of a civilian has just begun. This work needs to be accelerated so that officers, including soldiers (particularly in COunter INsurgency operations; COIN), do not become victims of their own circumstances; wherein they end-up in the fatal shooting of innocent civilians like Mr. Polanco, or killing one of their own, committing fratricide.

Moin Rahman
Founder/Principal Scientist
HVHF Sciences, LLC
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